"His name is Joe Wippl." - 5:13 AM 2/18/2020 - Excerpt from Ron Suskind's Book "The Way Of The World"
https://fbinewsreview.blogspot.com/2020/02/his-name-is-joe-wippl-513-am-2182020.html
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Post Link - 5:13 AM 2/18/2020 - "His name is Joe Wippl."
https://fbinewsreview.blogspot.com/2020/02/his-name-is-joe-wippl-513-am-2182020.html
__________________________________________________________________________________
Ron Suskind - The Way Of The World
The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism is a 2008 non-fiction book by Ron Suskind, claiming various actions and policies of the George W. Bush administration. Most notably, it alleges that the Bush administration ordered the forgery of the Habbush letter to implicate Iraq as having ties to al Qaeda and the hijackers in the September 11 attacks. All these claims have been strenuously denied by the White House and all parties involved. The book, published on August 5, 2008, by Harper, met mixed reviews but received considerable media attention and created controversy. - W
Search - Find: "Uhrlau": "His name is Joe Wippl."
Page 96/229 - Ron Suskind - The Way Of The World
"THE SECOND PART OF THE case against Hussein that led to war involved the biological weapons facilities. The central source for this intelligence was Rafid Ahmed, an Iraqi defector to Germany better known by his codename Curveball. We know a great deal about him now. It is common knowledge that Curveball turned out to be a skilled fabricator and that his tales about germ factories and mobile labs—the core of Colin Powell’s UN speech that made America’s case for war—were false. Much has been made of how the U.S. government, and CIA specifically, wanted to question Curveball directly but was denied access by the German government. Had they been given access, they might have discovered that he was a fabricator. That’s actually a cover story. The truth is that someone inside of CIA—a man the Germans trusted completely—recommended to the Germans that they never provide the United States with access to Curveball. His name is Joe Wippl. Another missing man in a picked-over drama. The key man. Starting in 2001, Wippl was CIA’s chief of station for Germany. It’s a big job. Germany is the most powerful country in Europe, and Wippl, one of the best German speakers in the agency, handled everything German. But by early 2002, it was clear inside CIA that there was a problem with Wippl. He was popping up in various European cities without following basic agency regulations that required him to report his movements to his home office and the local CIA offices in places he’d turn up. Large CIA stations, such as Vienna, would call Langley and wonder “what the hell’s Joe Wippl doing here?” He was also showing up in electronic surveillance the United States was conducting on various German officials, including some top intelligence officers. They were talking about Wippl and the things he was telling them. Several high-ranking CIA managers became concerned, including Stephen Kappes, the number two official in the Directorate of Operation, the agency’s clandestine service; Richer, then CIA’s head of Human Resources; and Tyler Drumheller, head of the European Division. They started an informal inquiry. According to several of those involved, they found that Wippl’s activities presented a particularly problematic mix. He was a married man—his wife lived in Northern Virginia—moving secretly among what seemed like several women, any number of whom could be German agents;
he was spending inordinate, and unreported, time with Ernst Uhrlau, head of the German intelligence service;
and he was telling his German counterparts things that were unauthorized, highly critical of the current CIA leadership, and sometimes at odds with U.S. policies, including—importantly—that the Germans keep Curveball to themselves. What also became clear to CIA electronic surveillance at this point, in mid-2002, was that the Germans felt Curveball was possibly unreliable. Wippl, they found, was fearful of placing an unreliable German source in the midst of the Bush administration’s march to war in Iraq. He knew it would end badly and might cause a rupture in U.S.-German relations, which he felt was the most important priority, so he secretly recommended the Germans never give the United States access to Curveball. “A lot of us wanted to fire him,” said one top official involved in arguments about how to handle the Wippl mess, “but the very top guys didn’t have the guts.” Instead, Wippl was called to Langley in August 2002 and told he’d be leaving his post in the coming year. He was not told everything that had been discovered, because officials feared they would spoil the source inside German intelligence who had been providing them with information, counterintelligence, on Wippl. At this point, the White House was ramping up its program to sell the war to the American public, and its case would rely heavily on Curveball. In the months leading up to the war, CIA officials to tried get access to the Iraqi, but they were blocked by the Germans, who were following Wippl’s advice. But there was another player in the mix: DIA, which was closely aligned with the Vice President’s Office. Defense Intelligence had managed to claim the Curveball matter as their own, and this meant that CIA’s questions about Curveball and matters of access all had to pass through DIA. The United States never got access to Curveball. The testimony he gave the Germans was filtered secondhand through DIA and became the core of Powell’s testimony on February 5, 2003. Six weeks later, the United States invaded Iraq. By late spring, the mobile trailers Curveball had described as at the heart of Saddam’s biological weapons operation were found to produce hydrogen for weather balloons. They literally produced hot air. U.S. troops, at that point, were in Baghdad. Joe Wippl, meanwhile, was essentially AWOL, moving through Europe and among various girlfriends, occasionally showing up at conferences representing CIA. He was still in close contact with German intelligence. At one point, he called a senior diplomat in Germany on what both men knew was a tapped phone—with the Germans listening in on the other end—and seemed to pass some messages along for those eavesdropping. The official, fumbling, told Wippl “this is not a secure line and you know it,” and hung up. By summer, Wippl was gone. The perfidies of prewar intelligence were just then filtering out. Joe Wilson, a former State Department official, led the charge, publicly disputing the Niger claims only to have his wife, Valerie Plame—an undercover CIA agent handling WMD who once worked for Rolf—outed by administration officials. A yearlong bout of recriminations and leaks followed as it became increasingly clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The White House blamed CIA, saying the agency was at fault for the specious intelligence behind the case for war. Much of CIA’s management was gone, or on its way out, by the late summer of 2004. Tenet led the way and was replaced by a close ally of the White House, a Republican congressman and former CIA agent named Porter Goss. And then a strange thing happened. The Vice President’s Office recommended that Joe Wippl be hired for the plum job of congressional liaison from CIA. He was. Some old hands still at the agency speculate that Wippl— who was in regular touch with DIA officials at the time he was recommending to the Germans that they deny CIA access to Curveball—was secretly acting, in 2002, at the behest of the Vice President’s Office. Wippl, who was also friendly with various officials around Goss, including Dusty Foggo—who was later indicted on bribery charges—has admitted to friends he was terrible at the congressional job, but delighted to get it. All the former directors of CIA, or DCIs, met at the agency’s Langley headquarters in August 2005. It was a long line, including George H. W. Bush, Stansfield Turner, Bob Gates, Jim Woolsey, and Porter Goss. Goss would be the last of them. The CIA, injured—some would say mortally—by the struggle over prewar intelligence, would cease to exist as it had since its formation in 1947. It would now be subordinate to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Wippl was fired as head of CIA’s Congressional Liaison Office in 2006. But, somehow, he remained on the CIA payroll—and got another plum job, this time running a one-man intelligence “institute” at Boston University. For a man twice fired, it was astonishing good fortune.
Somebody up there must like him."
_______________________________________________________________________
See Also:
joseph wippl cia and 9/11
joseph wippl cia and ernst uhrlau
tyler drumheller and ernst uhrlau
__________________________________________________________________________
Main Article:
Trump, Putin, and the New Abwehr - By Michael Novakhov (Mike Nova) February 16, 2020
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Post Link - 5:13 AM 2/18/2020 - "His name is Joe Wippl."
https://fbinewsreview.blogspot.com/2020/02/his-name-is-joe-wippl-513-am-2182020.html
__________________________________________________________________________________
Ron Suskind - The Way Of The World
The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism is a 2008 non-fiction book by Ron Suskind, claiming various actions and policies of the George W. Bush administration. Most notably, it alleges that the Bush administration ordered the forgery of the Habbush letter to implicate Iraq as having ties to al Qaeda and the hijackers in the September 11 attacks. All these claims have been strenuously denied by the White House and all parties involved. The book, published on August 5, 2008, by Harper, met mixed reviews but received considerable media attention and created controversy. - W
Search - Find: "Uhrlau": "His name is Joe Wippl."
Page 96/229 - Ron Suskind - The Way Of The World
"THE SECOND PART OF THE case against Hussein that led to war involved the biological weapons facilities. The central source for this intelligence was Rafid Ahmed, an Iraqi defector to Germany better known by his codename Curveball. We know a great deal about him now. It is common knowledge that Curveball turned out to be a skilled fabricator and that his tales about germ factories and mobile labs—the core of Colin Powell’s UN speech that made America’s case for war—were false. Much has been made of how the U.S. government, and CIA specifically, wanted to question Curveball directly but was denied access by the German government. Had they been given access, they might have discovered that he was a fabricator. That’s actually a cover story. The truth is that someone inside of CIA—a man the Germans trusted completely—recommended to the Germans that they never provide the United States with access to Curveball. His name is Joe Wippl. Another missing man in a picked-over drama. The key man. Starting in 2001, Wippl was CIA’s chief of station for Germany. It’s a big job. Germany is the most powerful country in Europe, and Wippl, one of the best German speakers in the agency, handled everything German. But by early 2002, it was clear inside CIA that there was a problem with Wippl. He was popping up in various European cities without following basic agency regulations that required him to report his movements to his home office and the local CIA offices in places he’d turn up. Large CIA stations, such as Vienna, would call Langley and wonder “what the hell’s Joe Wippl doing here?” He was also showing up in electronic surveillance the United States was conducting on various German officials, including some top intelligence officers. They were talking about Wippl and the things he was telling them. Several high-ranking CIA managers became concerned, including Stephen Kappes, the number two official in the Directorate of Operation, the agency’s clandestine service; Richer, then CIA’s head of Human Resources; and Tyler Drumheller, head of the European Division. They started an informal inquiry. According to several of those involved, they found that Wippl’s activities presented a particularly problematic mix. He was a married man—his wife lived in Northern Virginia—moving secretly among what seemed like several women, any number of whom could be German agents;
he was spending inordinate, and unreported, time with Ernst Uhrlau, head of the German intelligence service;
and he was telling his German counterparts things that were unauthorized, highly critical of the current CIA leadership, and sometimes at odds with U.S. policies, including—importantly—that the Germans keep Curveball to themselves. What also became clear to CIA electronic surveillance at this point, in mid-2002, was that the Germans felt Curveball was possibly unreliable. Wippl, they found, was fearful of placing an unreliable German source in the midst of the Bush administration’s march to war in Iraq. He knew it would end badly and might cause a rupture in U.S.-German relations, which he felt was the most important priority, so he secretly recommended the Germans never give the United States access to Curveball. “A lot of us wanted to fire him,” said one top official involved in arguments about how to handle the Wippl mess, “but the very top guys didn’t have the guts.” Instead, Wippl was called to Langley in August 2002 and told he’d be leaving his post in the coming year. He was not told everything that had been discovered, because officials feared they would spoil the source inside German intelligence who had been providing them with information, counterintelligence, on Wippl. At this point, the White House was ramping up its program to sell the war to the American public, and its case would rely heavily on Curveball. In the months leading up to the war, CIA officials to tried get access to the Iraqi, but they were blocked by the Germans, who were following Wippl’s advice. But there was another player in the mix: DIA, which was closely aligned with the Vice President’s Office. Defense Intelligence had managed to claim the Curveball matter as their own, and this meant that CIA’s questions about Curveball and matters of access all had to pass through DIA. The United States never got access to Curveball. The testimony he gave the Germans was filtered secondhand through DIA and became the core of Powell’s testimony on February 5, 2003. Six weeks later, the United States invaded Iraq. By late spring, the mobile trailers Curveball had described as at the heart of Saddam’s biological weapons operation were found to produce hydrogen for weather balloons. They literally produced hot air. U.S. troops, at that point, were in Baghdad. Joe Wippl, meanwhile, was essentially AWOL, moving through Europe and among various girlfriends, occasionally showing up at conferences representing CIA. He was still in close contact with German intelligence. At one point, he called a senior diplomat in Germany on what both men knew was a tapped phone—with the Germans listening in on the other end—and seemed to pass some messages along for those eavesdropping. The official, fumbling, told Wippl “this is not a secure line and you know it,” and hung up. By summer, Wippl was gone. The perfidies of prewar intelligence were just then filtering out. Joe Wilson, a former State Department official, led the charge, publicly disputing the Niger claims only to have his wife, Valerie Plame—an undercover CIA agent handling WMD who once worked for Rolf—outed by administration officials. A yearlong bout of recriminations and leaks followed as it became increasingly clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The White House blamed CIA, saying the agency was at fault for the specious intelligence behind the case for war. Much of CIA’s management was gone, or on its way out, by the late summer of 2004. Tenet led the way and was replaced by a close ally of the White House, a Republican congressman and former CIA agent named Porter Goss. And then a strange thing happened. The Vice President’s Office recommended that Joe Wippl be hired for the plum job of congressional liaison from CIA. He was. Some old hands still at the agency speculate that Wippl— who was in regular touch with DIA officials at the time he was recommending to the Germans that they deny CIA access to Curveball—was secretly acting, in 2002, at the behest of the Vice President’s Office. Wippl, who was also friendly with various officials around Goss, including Dusty Foggo—who was later indicted on bribery charges—has admitted to friends he was terrible at the congressional job, but delighted to get it. All the former directors of CIA, or DCIs, met at the agency’s Langley headquarters in August 2005. It was a long line, including George H. W. Bush, Stansfield Turner, Bob Gates, Jim Woolsey, and Porter Goss. Goss would be the last of them. The CIA, injured—some would say mortally—by the struggle over prewar intelligence, would cease to exist as it had since its formation in 1947. It would now be subordinate to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Wippl was fired as head of CIA’s Congressional Liaison Office in 2006. But, somehow, he remained on the CIA payroll—and got another plum job, this time running a one-man intelligence “institute” at Boston University. For a man twice fired, it was astonishing good fortune.
Somebody up there must like him."
_______________________________________________________________________
See Also:
joseph wippl cia and 9/11
joseph wippl cia and ernst uhrlau
tyler drumheller and ernst uhrlau
__________________________________________________________________________
Main Article:
Trump, Putin, and the New Abwehr - By Michael Novakhov (Mike Nova) February 16, 2020
______________________________________
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